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ABSTRACT 
We investigated whether differences in quality of firm-level corporate 
governance can explain the firm-level performance in a cross-section of 
companies listed at Karachi Stock Exchange. Therefore, we analysed the 
relationship between firm-level value as measured by Tobin’s Q and total 
Corporate Governance Index (CGI) and three sub-indices: Board, Shareholdings 
and Ownership, and Disclosures and Transparency for a sample of 50 firms. The 
results indicate that corporate governance does matter in Pakistan. However, not 
all elements of governance are important. The board composition and ownership 
and shareholdings enhance firm performance, whereas disclosure and 
transparency has no significant effect on firm performance. We point out that 
those adequate firm-level governance standards can not replace the solidity of 
the firm. The low production and bad management practices can not be covered 
with transparent disclosures and transparency standards.  
 
JEL classification:  G12, G34, G38 
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Firm Performance, Tobin’s Q, Agency 
Problem, Board Size, Shareholdings, Disclosures, Leverage, 
Code of Corporate Governance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION* 
Good corporate governance contributes to sustainable economic 
development by enhancing the performance of companies and increasing their 
access to outside capital. In emerging markets good corporate governance serves 
a number of public policy objectives. It reduces vulnerability of the financial 
crises, reinforcement property rights; reduces transaction cost and cost of capital 
and leads to capital market development. Corporate governance concerns the 
relationship among the management, board of directors, controlling 
shareholders, minority shareholders and other stakeholders. In Pakistan, the 
publication of the SECP Corporate Governance Code 2002 for publicly listed 
companies has made it an important area of research of corporate sector. 
A corporate governance system is comprised of a wide range of practices 
and institutions, from accounting standards and laws concerning financial 
disclosure, to executive compensation, to size and composition of corporate 
boards. A corporate governance system defines who owns the firm, and dictates 
the rules by which economic returns are distributed among shareholders, 
employees, managers, and other stakeholders. As such, a country’s corporate 
governance regime has deep implications for firm organisation, employment 
systems, trading relationships, and capital markets. Thus, changes in Pakistani 
system of corporate governance are likely to have important consequences for 
the structure and conduct of country business. 
In its broadest sense, corporate governance refers to a complementary set 
of legal, economic, and social institutions that protect the interests of a 
corporation’s owners. In the Anglo-American system of corporate governance 
these owners are shareholders. The concept of corporate governance presumes a 
fundamental tension between shareholders and corporate managers [Berle and 
Means (1932) and Jensen and Meckling (1976)]. While the objective of a 
corporation’s shareholders is a return on their investment, managers are likely to 
have other goals, such as the power and prestige of running a large and powerful 
organisation, or entertainment and other perquisites of their position. In this 
situation, managers’ superior access to inside information and the relatively 
powerless position of the numerous and dispersed shareholders, mean that 
managers are likely to have the upper hand. The researchers have offered a 
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number of solutions for this agency problem between shareholders and 
managers which fall under the categories of incentive alignment, monitoring, 
and discipline. Incentives of managers and shareholders can be aligned through 
practices such as stock options or other market-based compensation [Fama and 
Jensen (1983)]. Monitoring by an independent and engaged board of directors 
assures that managers behave in the best interests of the shareholders [Fama and 
Jensen (1983)]. Chief Executive Officer (CEO)’s who fail to maximise 
shareholder interests can be removed by concerned boards of directors, and a 
firm that neglects shareholder value is disciplined by the market through hostile 
takeover1 [Jensen and Ruback (1983)].  
The code of corporate governance introduced by SECP in early 2002 
is the major step in corporate governance reforms in Pakistan. The code 
includes many recommendations in line with international good practice. 
The major areas of enforcement include reforms of board of directors in 
order to make it accountable to all shareholders and better disclosure 
including improved internal and external audits for listed companies. 
However, the code’s limited provisions on director’s independence remain 
voluntary and provide no guidance on internal controls, risk management 
and board compensation policies. 
The main focus of this study is to examine the relationship between 
corporate governance and firm performance for publicly listed Karachi Stock 
Exchange (KSE) firms. Therefore, we attempt to identify the relationship 
between corporate governance proxies and firm value in our sample of KSE 
firms. This emphasises the importance of legal rules and the quality of their 
enforcement. In Pakistan, with traditionally low dispersion of ownership, the 
primary methods to solve agency problems are the legal protection of minority 
investors, the use of boards as monitors of senior management, and an active 
market for corporate control. In contrast to developed markets in Pakistan 
corporate governance is characterised by lesser reliance on capital markets and 
outside investors, but stronger reliance on large inside investors and financial 
institutions to achieve efficiency in the corporate sector. In this case, outside 
(smaller) investors face the risk of expropriation in the form of wealth transfers 
to larger shareholders.  
The plan of the study is as follows. The review of empirical findings of 
previous research is presented in Section 2. Section 3 briefly reviews the 
corporate governance policy framework of Pakistan.  The construction of 
corporate governance index is provided in Section 4. Section 5 explores the 
relationship between corporate governance and performance and provides a 
description of the data. Section 6 presents the results for the relationship 
between corporate governance and firm valuation and last section concludes. 
                                                 
1Takeover which goes against the wishes of the target company’s management and board of 
directors. 
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2.  REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
There is a large body of empirical research that has assessed the impact of 
corporate governance on firm performance for the developed markets. Studies 
have shown that good governance practices have led the significant increase in 
the economic value added of firms, higher productivity and lower risk of 
systematic financial failure for countries. The studies by Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997), John and Senbet (1998) and Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) provide an 
excellent literature review in this area. It has now become an important area of 
research in emerging markets as well.  
There are some empirical studies that analyse the impact of different 
corporate governance practices in the cross-section of countries. A noteworthy 
study in this regard is done by Mitton (2001) with sample of 398 firms Korean, 
Malaysian, Indonesian, Philippines, data Thailand have found that the firm-level 
differences in variables are related to corporate governance has strong impact on 
firm performance during East Asian Crisis in 1997 and 1998. The results 
suggests that better price performance is associated with firms that have 
indicators of higher disclosure quality, with firms that have higher outside 
ownership concentration and with firms that are focused rather than diversified.  
Most of the empirical work for exploring possible relationship between 
corporate governance and firm performance is done for single jurisdiction. For 
US Firms a broad measure of Corporate Governance Gov-Score is prepared by 
Brown and Caylor (2004) with 51 factors, 8 sub categories for 2327 firms based 
on dataset of Institutional Shareholder Service (ISS). Their findings indicate that 
better governed firms are relatively more profitable, more valuable and pay 
more cash to their shareholders. Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) use Investor 
Responsibility Research Centre (IRRC) data, and conclude that firms with fewer 
shareholder rights have lower firm valuations and lower stock returns. They 
classify 24 governance factors into five groups: tactics for delaying hostile 
takeover, voting rights, director/officer protection, other takeover defenses, and 
state laws. Most of these factors are anti-takeover measures so G-Index is 
effectively an index of anti-takeover protection rather than a broad index of 
governance. Their findings show that firms with stronger shareholders rights 
have higher firm value, higher profits, higher sales growth, lowest capital 
expenditures, and made fewer corporate acquisitions. 
It is expected that limiting board size is to improve firm performance 
because the benefits by larger boards of increased monitoring are outweighed by 
the poorer communication and decision-making of larger groups [Lipton and 
Lorsch (1992); Jensen (1993)]. The study by Yermack (1996) provides an 
inverse relation between board size and profitability, asset utilisation, and 
Tobin’s Q which conform this hypothesis. Anderson, et al. (2004) document that 
the cost of debt is lower for larger boards, because creditors view these firms as 
having more effective monitors of their financial accounting processes. Brown 
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and Caylor (2004) add to this literature by showing that firms with board sizes 
of between 6 and 15 have higher returns on equity and higher net profit margins 
than do firms with other board sizes 
The relation between the proportion of outside directors, a proxy for 
board independence, and firm performance is inconclusive.  Fosberg (1989) 
finds no relation between the proportion of outsider directors and various 
performance measures Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) find no association 
between the proportion of outsider directors and Tobin’s Q; and Bhagat and 
Black (2002) find no linkage between proportion of outsider directors and 
Tobin’s Q, return on assets, asset turnover and stock returns. In contrast, 
Baysinger and Butler (1985) and Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) show that the 
market rewards firms for appointing outside directors; Brickley, Coles, and 
Terry (1994) find a positive relation between the proportion of outsider directors 
and the stock market reaction to poison pill adoptions; and Anderson, Mansi and 
Reeb (2004) show that the cost of debt, as proxied by bond yield spreads, is 
inversely related to board independence. Studies using financial statement data 
and Tobin’s Q find no link between board independence and firm performance, 
while those using stock returns data or bond yield data find a positive link. 
Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) and Bhagat and Black (2002). Brown and 
Caylor (2004) do not find Tobin’s Q to increase in board independence, but they 
do find that firms with independent boards have higher returns on equity, higher 
profit margins, larger dividend yields, and larger stock repurchases, suggesting 
that board independence is associated with other important measures of firm 
performance aside from Tobin’s Q. 
The evidence on the association between audit-related governance 
factors and firm performance is mixed. Brown and Caylor (2004) show that 
independent audit committees are positively related to dividend yield, but 
not to operating performance or firm valuation. They also find that the 
consulting fees paid to auditors less than audit fees paid to auditors are 
negatively related to performance measures and company has a formal 
policy on auditor rotation is positively related to return on equity but not to 
their performance measures. Klein (2002) documents a negative relation 
between earnings management and audit committee independence, and 
Anderson, et al. (2004) find that entirely independent audit committees have 
lower debt financing costs. Frankel, et al. (2002) show a negative relation 
between earnings management and auditor independence (based on audit 
versus non-audit fees). However, Ashbaugh, et al. (2003) and Larcker and 
Richardson (2004) come up with a contradictory evidence. Kinney, et al. 
(2004) findings show no association between earnings restatements and fees 
paid for financial information systems design and implementation or internal 
audit services, and Agrawal and Chadha (2005) come up with similar 
conclusion in this regard.  
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The separation of CEO and chairman affects firms’ performance because 
the agency problems are higher when the same person holds both positions. 
Yermack (1996) shows that firms are more valuable when the CEO and board 
chair positions are separate by analysing a sample of 452 U.S. public firms 
between (1984 and 1991). Core, et  al. (1999) find that CEO compensation is 
lower when the CEO and board chair positions are separate. Brown and Caylor 
(2004) conclude that firms are more valuable when the CEO and board chair 
positions are separate. Botosan and Plumlee (2001) find a material effect of 
expensing stock options on return on assets. They use Fortune’s list of the 100 
fastest growing companies as of September 1999, and compute the effect of 
expensing stock options on firms’ operating performance. Fich and Shivdasani 
(2004) find that firms with director stock option plans have higher market to 
book ratios, higher profitability and they document a positive stock market 
reaction when firms announce stock option plans for their directors. Brown and 
Caylor on the other hand come up with a contradictory conclusion and find no 
evidence that operating performance or firm valuation is positively related either 
to stock option expensing or to directors receiving some or all of their fees in 
stock. 
In the past few years, corporate governance has become an important 
area of research in Pakistan. In his noteworthy work Cheema (2003) suggests 
that corporate governance can play a significant role for Pakistan to attract 
foreign direct investment and mobilise greater saving through capital provided 
the corporate governance system is compatible with the objective of raising 
external equity capital through capital markets. The corporate structure of 
Pakistan is characterised as concentrated family control, interlocking 
directorships, cross-shareholdings and pyramid structures. The concern is that 
reforms whose main objective is minority shareholder protection may dampen 
profit maximising incentives for families without providing offsetting benefits 
in the form of equally efficient monitoring by minority shareholders. If this 
happens the reform may end up creating sub optimal incentives for profit 
maximisation by families. They argue that a crucial challenge for policy 
makers is to optimise the dual objectives of minority shareholder protection 
and the maintenance of profit-maximising incentives for family controllers. 
There is a need for progressive corporates to take a lead in the corporate 
governance reform effort as well. 
Rais and Saeed (2005) analyse the Corporate Governance Code 2002 in 
the light of Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) framework and its 
enforcement and application in Pakistan in order to understand the dynamics of 
public decision making and assess the efficacy of the regulation policy of SECP 
in the arena of corporate governance. The analysis shows that though the listed 
companies are gearing themselves up to adopt the Code, there are some 
constraints, and reservations about the way it was drafted and implemented. The 
study by Ghani, et al. (2002) examines business groups and their impact on 
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corporate governance in Pakistan for non-financial firms listed on the Karachi 
Stock Exchange of Pakistan for 1998-2002. Their evidence indicates that 
investors view the business-group as a mechanism to expropriate minority 
shareholders. On the other hand, the comparative financial performance results 
suggest that business groups in Pakistan are efficient economic arrangements 
that substitute for missing or inefficient outside institutions and markets. The 
study by Ashraf and Ghani (2005) examines the origins, growth, and the 
development of accounting practices and disclosures in Pakistan and the factors 
that influenced them. They document that lack of investor protection (e.g., 
minority rights protection, insider trading protection), judicial inefficiencies, and 
weak enforcement mechanisms are more critical factors than are cultural factors 
in explaining the state of accounting in Pakistan. They conclude that it is the 
enforcement mechanisms that are paramount in improving the quality of 
accounting in developing economies. 
There is an increasing interest in analysing affect of corporate governance 
on stock market in Pakistan but many issues in this area are uncovered. In 
particular, firm-level corporate governance rating and its affect on the valuation 
of the firm which is central issue of this area needs in depth research. It is in this 
perspective this study aims to make contribution in the literature on corporate 
governance.  
 
3.  CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN PAKISTAN 
The code of corporate governance introduced by SECP in early 2002 is 
the major step in corporate governance reforms in Pakistan. The code is initially 
started as a joint effort of SECP and Institute of Chartered Accountant Pakistan 
(ICAP). All listed companies are required to comply with most provisions of the 
code.  
The corporate legal framework includes the corporate Ordinance 1984 
which sets the rules for the governance and regulations of companies and certain 
other associations and is based on common law. Banks are regulated by the 
banking company ordinance (BCO) 1962 and prudential issued by SBP. The key 
legislation of corporate governance includes the Securities and Exchange 
Ordinance 1969 the Companies Ordinance 1984 and Securities and Exchange 
Commission Act 1997 that established the SECP as principle regulator of 
securities markets and non-bank companies and also non-listed companies. The 
Securities and Exchange Ordinance 1969 is the basic securities law, and 
provides for investor protection, market regulation, securities delisting and 
related matters, and the prevention of fraud and insider trading. The Securities 
and Exchange Ordinance Act 1997 established SECP as regulator of capital 
marked and controller of corporate entities. The listed Companies (Substantial 
Acquisition of Voting shares and Takeovers) Ordinance 2002 establishes 
additional take over and ownership disclosure rules. In addition to listing rules, 
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disclosures, the listing rules include special regulations on transfer pricing. The 
listed companies must inform the exchanges about dividends, annual general 
meetings (AGMs), capital increases and change in boards. 
The code includes many recommendations in line with international good 
practice. Several provisions of code were already added to Corporate Ordinance 
1984, when it was amended into 2002, in order to strengthen monitory 
shareholders’ rights. The State Bank also mandated the application of code for 
all listed and non-listed banks and Development Finance Institutes (DFIs). This 
requirement backed by State Bank considerable enforcement capacity resulted in 
significant changes within banking system. The SECP issued a separate code for 
insurance companies. 
The basic shareholders rights are protected in Pakistan. The registration is 
secure and dematerialised through Central Depository Committee (CDC). 
Shareholders can demand a variety of information directly from the company 
and have a clear right to participate in AGM. Directors are elected using a form 
of cumulative voting and can remove through share holder resolution. The 
changes in the company articles, increasing authorised capital and sale of major 
corporate assets are require shareholders approval.  
While more effective enforcement contributed to improve compliance, 
some companies do not hold AGMs or hold in places where it is difficult for 
shareholders to reach. The law also does not support voting by post or 
electronically. The concentrated control limits and influence of minority 
shareholders, and effectively reduce their protection from abuse. When families 
dominate the shareholders meeting and board, director’s accountability to other 
shareholders become critical and currently in Pakistan this accountability is 
absent in many companies. The shareholder recording process for share hold in 
the CDC works effectively. However, although the registration’s role has been 
reduced by the CDC’s operations, some inefficiencies are still there. Some 
companies do not pay dividend on time, and take longer than 5 days to re-
register share in the name of depository. The annual reports of SECP suggest 
that the percentage of companies paying dividends is 35 percent and 
shareholders can complain SECP about non-payment of dividends. 
The quality of disclosure has improved over last four years due to 
increasing monitoring role of the SECP and the requirement of code. 
Shareholders owning 10 percent or more of voting capital disclose their 
ownership and the annual report includes the pattern for major shareholdings. 
However pyramid structure, cross holdings and the absence of joint action make 
it difficult for outsiders to understand the ownership structure of companies,  
especially in case of business groups. 
The family owned companies are typically managed by owners 
themselves. In case of state owned enterprises and multinationals there is 
often direct relationship between state/foreign owners and management 
again bypassing the boards. Many important corporate decisions are not 
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made on Board AGMs level. The code explicitly mentions director’s duties 
to act with objective an independent judgment and in the best interest of 
company. In business groups boards are dominated by executive and non-
executive members of controlling family and by proxy directors appointed to 
act on their behalf. Inter-looking directorships are often used to retain 
majority control. Family dominated boards are less able to protect minority 
shareholder’s rights and risk a loss of competitiveness as other boards 
become more professional. 
The code strengthen the role of non-executive directors by restricting the 
percentage of executive director to 75 percent in non-financial firms and 
recommending that institutional investor in 75 percent in non-financial firms and 
recommending institutional investor be representation. However given the 
dominant ownership structure, this does not present controlling families from 
having disproportionate representation on the board.  
The SECP is enforcing corporate governance regulations SECP is 
receiving technical assistance from Asian Development Bank to improve 
corporate governance enforcement programme and also from World Bank is 
build awareness and training. Other elements of enforcement regime are not 
so strong ICAP has some self-regulatory function and stock exchanges are 
lacked the resources and expertise to effective monitor implementation of 
the code.  KSE has set up a Board Committee on the Code of Corporate 
Governance and a unit in the Company Affairs Department to monitor 
compliance with the code. 
 
4.  CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INDEX 
It is expected that better corporate governance is correlated with better 
operating performance and higher market valuation in case of KSE listed firms. 
To examine the relationship between corporate governance and firm 
performance, a corporate governance index (CGI) is developed as a proxy for 
firm-level governance quality with a variety of different governance practices 
adopted by listed firms. 
In order to construct corporate governance index for the firms listed on 
KSE, a broad, multifactor corporate governance rating is done which is based on 
the data obtained from the annual reports of the firms submitted to SECP. The 
index construction is as follows: for every firm, there are 22 governance proxies 
or indicators are selected, these indicators are categorised into three main 
themes. The three categories or sub-indices consist of: eight factors for the 
Board, seven for ownership, shareholdings and seven for transparency, 
disclosure and audit. 
The weighting is in the construction of index is based on subjective 
judgments. The assigned priorities amongst and within each category is guided 
by empirical literature and financial experts in this area. The maximum score is 
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100, then, a score of 100 is assigned if factor is observed, 80 if largely observed, 
50 for partially observed and 0 if it is not observed.2 The average is taken out 
and we arrive at the rating of one sub-index. By taking the average of three sub-
indices we obtain CGI for a particular firm. 
Each sub-index comprises of series of factors leading to measure 
corporate governance. Board composition index captures board autonomy, 
structure and effectiveness. Autonomy is measured through various indicators of 
board independence including percentage of nominees, outside and independent 
directors on board, separation of CEO and chairman, a separate CFO (Corporate 
Financial Officer). The various measures of board effectiveness are chair CEO 
split, regularity of meetings, and attendance by outside board members, and 
creditor’s nominee on board. 
The separation of role of CEO and chair dilutes the power of CEO and 
increases board’s ability to properly execute the oversight judgment. It also 
critically evaluates executive directors and the presence of non-executive 
member on board reduces the influence of management on the board. Moreover 
a higher proportion of outside directors3 on the board lead to higher company 
performance. The CEO may find a smaller board more easily dominated and 
more manageable due to the potential for social cohesion [Shaw (1981)]. A large 
group of directors would require more time and effort on the part of CEO to 
build census for a given course of action. Therefore if the board is large, its 
independence is increased in the sense that the CEO’s ability to influence is 
diluted and it is more difficult for the CEO to dominate the board. There is also 
some evidence in favour of larger boards. Chaganli, Mahajam, and Sharma 
(1983) have studied the relationship between board size and bankruptcy and 
have found that non-failed firms in their sample, tended to have larger boards 
then the failed firms. Thus larger boards may be more independent of 
management and that is the reason that the larger boards are associated with 
higher performance. 
The ownership and shareholdings is the second aspect of corporate 
governance. The purpose of this sub-index is to measure the degree to which the 
board and managers have incentives that align their interest with those of 
shareholders. The third sub-index deals with disclosures. It attempts to measure 
the public commitment of the firm to good governance. Components following 
full disclosure of corporate governance practices, directors’ bibliography, and 
internal audit committee reduce information asymmetry and it is valued by 
investor [Klein, et al. (2005)].  
                                                 
2This is based on the report of World Bank, Report on the Observance of Standards and 
Code (ROSC), Corporate Governance country assessment: Pakistan’ June 2005.  
3Any member of a company’s board of directors who is not an employee or shareholder in 
the company. 
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5.  DATA AND METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK 
It is well established that country’s laws of corporate governance affect 
firm value.4  In this study, we examine whether variation in firm-specific 
governance is associated with differences in firm value in case of Pakistani stock 
market. To explore the relationship between corporate governance and firm 
valuation, Tobin’s Q5 is used as valuation measure. The sample of 50 firms6 is 
selected: which are representative of all non-financial sectors and active in their 
sector, comprises more than 70 percent of market capitalisation and listed on 
KSE. The data is obtained from the annual reports of these firms for the year 
2003, 2004 and 2005. The Tobin Q, CGI and other control variables are 
constructed and average is taken out for these three years. 
In exploring that good corporate governance causes higher firm valuation, 
an important issue is endogenity [Black, et al. (2003)]. The firms with higher 
market value would be more likely to choose better governance structure 
because of two reasons. First, firm’s insiders believe that better governance 
structure will further raise firm value. Second, firms adopt good governance to 
signal that insider behave well. A growing firm with large need of external 
financing has more incentive to adopt better governance practices in an attempt 
to lower cost of capital [Klapper and Love (2003) and Gompers, et al. (2003)). 
These growth opportunities are reflected in the valuation of the firm, implying a 
positive association between governance and firm performance. This 
endogeinety problem in estimation is resolved by applying Generalised Method 
of Moments as estimation technique.  
Following Black, et al. (2003) and Klein, et al. (2005) we also add 
appropriate control variables, which are assumed to be associated with higher 
governance rating. Accordingly, we control the size of the firm by adding 
logarithm of book asset value, firm’s age by using logarithm of number of years 
listed at KSE [Shin and Stulz (2000)]. The measure of leverage focuses on the 
capital employed and best represents the effect of past financing decisions and it 
is defined debt-to-total asset ratio. The growth is included as control variable 
and defined as average growth rate sales over last three years [Gompers, et al. 
(2003) and Klein, et al. (2005)]. 
We have estimated a model in which firm’s performance estimated by 
Tobin Q is regressed on corporate governance indices and other control 
variables [Kaplan and Zingales’ (1997); Black, et al. (2002) and Klein, et al. 
(2005)]. Along with three governance indices, board, shareholdings and 
                                                 
4La Porta, et al. (2001) show that firm value is positively associated with the rights of 
minority shareholders. Daines (2001) finds that firms incorporated in Delaware have higher 
valuations than other U.S. firms. 
5Tobin’s Q: (the book value of long term debt plus the market value of equity) divided by 
book value of total assets. 
6List of companies is presented in Appendix A2. 
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disclosure, a set of control variables which include size (ln assets), leverage 
(debt/total asset ratio) and growth (average sale growth) are used in estimation. 
Firm size and growth control for potential advantages of scale and scope, market 
power and market opportunities. The leverage controls for different risk 
characteristics of firm. The empirical specification of the model becomes,  
iiii cXbCGIaQ ε+++=     
where firm Qi is the average firm performance measure estimated for three years 
2003, 2004 and 2005.7  The CGIi is a vector of governance index and Xi is a 
vector of firm characteristics for these three years. This model is estimated on 
cross-section of 50 firms using the Generalised Method of Moments. This 
estimation technique is adopted to cope with presence of endogeniety in 
governance variables [Black, et al. (2002)]. The main problem in estimating the 
fully specified and identified model is limited availability of instrument 
variables.  
The potential instruments included in the estimation are dummy variables 
indicating foreign investment, block holding, included in the KSE 100 firms, age 
of firm as measure by listing year at KSE and variation in profit. A firm with 
foreign investment is assumed to be adopting good governance practice. In the 
same way the block holding firm8 is associated with more monitoring and more 
familiar with good governance practices. The longer the period of listing, the 
more chances of investors to familiar with investment strategy of firm and less 
likely chances of information asymmetry and this limit the ability of firm to 
impose poor practice. The difference in profit earning opportunities is associated 
with difference in value of the firms, more profit earning firms need access to 
capital markets to raise new capital and find it optimal to improve their 
governance practices. 
 
6.  EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
The results for analysing the impact of total Corporate Governance Index 
on firm performance are provided in Table 2. The results of Table 3 and 
Appendix table A4 are based on how sub-indices of corporate governance 
influence firm performance. Table 1 presents the summary statistics of total 
corporate governance index CGI and its sub-indices, which are Board 
Composition (Board), Ownership and Shareholdings (Share) and Disclosure, 
Transparency and auditing (Disc). These results are based on the averages of 
three years 2003, 2004 and 2005. The data to construct corporate governance 
rating are obtained from the annual reports of the listed firms from the website 
of SECP.  
                                                 
7Compliance of Corporate Governance started from the end of year 2002. 
8Block-holder is defined by investors as having more than 10 percent shareholdings. 
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Table 1 
Summary Statistics of Corporate Governance Index 
 Mean Max Min SD CGI Board Rights Disc 
CGI 54.30 70.42 30.89 7.99 1.00    
Board 55.58 87.50 25.00 16.02 0.62 1.00   
Share 46.97 78.57 7.14 16.10 0.57 0.11 1.00  
Disc 60.36 94.29 30.00 10.93 0.44 0.05 0.06 1.00 
 
This table provides the summary statistics of distribution of Corporate Governance 
index, and the sub-indices (Board, Shareholdings and Disclosure). The table also 
presents the pair-wise correlation between the indices. Appendix A1 gives detailed 
information on each sub-index. The maximum score is 100, which is assigned if 
indicator is observed, 80 if largely observed 50 for partially observed and 0 if it is 
not observed. The total index consist of governance proxies in three sub-categories 
and is constructed using the equal weighting scheme.  
 
Table 2 
Evidence on Firm Performance and Total Corporate Governance Index 
 1 2 3 4 
Total CGI 0.08 
(2.17) 
0.02 
(1.59) 
0.02 
(1.32) 
0.06 
(1.55) 
Size  0.05 
(3.61) 
0.03 
(2.02) 
0.02 
(2.66) 
Growth   0.65 
(0.64) 
0.10 
(0.20) 
Leverage     0.86 
(1.47) 
Intercept –3.30 
 (–1.71) 
–1.60 
(–1.83) 
–1.32 
(–1.36) 
–2.79 
(–1.02) 
R Square 0.10 0.14 0.15 0.29 
Notes: The results presented in this table are Generalised Method of Moments estimates for four 
different specifications for cross-section of 50 firms, the model is  
      Qi = a + bCGIi +cXi + εi 
Dependent variable is Tobin’s Q is (book value of debt plus market value of common 
equity) divided by book value of assets. CGI is total Corporate Governance Index. The 
control variables include: Firm size is natural logarithm of total assets; Leverage is book 
value of debt divided by book value of total asset; Growth is growth rate of sales.  
The instruments: Age is natural logarithm of number of years of listing at KSE, Profit is 
natural logarithm of net income/total assets, DFOR is dummy variable which is one if the 
firm has foreign investment and zero otherwise, DN is a dummy variable if the firms has 
block holder zero otherwise, DKSE, is a dummy variable if the firm is included in KSE 100 
index and zero otherwise.  
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The average rating of CGI is 54.30 and it ranges from 70.42 to 30.89. The 
sub-index with highest rating is Disc (Disclosure, Transparency and Auditing), 
which can be explained by the fact that this area is emphasised by regulations of 
SECP. 
The results of association between total corporate governance and Tobin 
Q are presented in Table 2. The Tobin Q is regressed on the total corporate 
governance index (CGI) with each of control variables add one by one. There is 
positive and significant relationship between CGI and Tobin’s Q supporting our 
hypothesis that corporate governance affects firm value. The CGI remains 
positive but significance level reduces with adding more explanatory variables. 
This shows that the inclusion of omitted variables have improved the 
specification of the model. Therefore we find some evidence that corporate 
governance effects firm’s performance. This result suggests that a certain level 
of governance regulations in emerging market like Pakistan has not make the 
overall level of governance up to a point that governance remain important for 
investor. The inter-firm differences are matters to investor in valuing firm. This 
result is also conformed by several studies for developing markets as well as 
developed markets [La Porta, et al. (2002) and Drobetz, et al. (2004)]. The 
financial control variables are for the most part statistically significant. The firm 
size is significantly related to performance. The growth and leverage are 
positively related but do not effect performance significantly.  
The results based on total corporate governance suggest that corporate 
governance does matter in Pakistani stock market. However these findings do not 
fully reveal the importance of each category of corporate governance to firm 
performance. In Table 3 and Appendix Table A, we present results regarding 
relationship of firm value with three sub-indices and all control variables. These 
results indicate that two sub-indices except disclosure have positive and some 
significant impact on firm performance. The Board composition and ownership 
and shareholdings have some significant influence on firm performance. However 
investors are not willing to pay a premium for companies that are engaged in open 
and full disclosure. The results based on sub-indices reveal importance of Board 
composition, ownership and shareholdings with firm performance and this 
evidence is also supported by other studies [Klein, et al. (2005)]. 
The Board Composition has a positive and statistically significant effect 
on firm performance and when entered in model with other sub-indices it 
remains positive but become insignificant but coefficient of determination has 
improved. This result is not unusual, as past evidence generally failed to find 
any significant relation between board composition and firm performance. The 
survey of literature concludes that the evidence on this matter is at the best 
ambiguous [Dalto, et al. (1998); Bahjat and Black (1999 and 2000) and 
Hermalian and Weisbach (2003)]. The ownership and shareholdings sub-index 
has  a  positive  effect  on  Tobin  Q when it is entered into model alone and also  
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Table 3 
Evidence on Performance and Corporate Governance Sub-indices 
 1 2 3 4 5 
CGI 0.01 
(1.04) 
    
Board  0.02 
(2.06) 
  0.01 
(1.13) 
Share   0.01 
(1.41) 
 0.01 
(1.67) 
Disc    0.01 
(0.44) 
0.02 
(0.51) 
Size 0.03 
(2.02) 
0.04 
(1.38) 
0.02 
(1.40) 
0.02 
(0.91) 
0.001 
(0.05) 
Leverage 1.09 
(0.90) 
4.56 
(2.02) 
3.03 
(1.83) 
2.21 
(1.84) 
0.92 
(2.72) 
Intercept –0.62 
(–0.71) 
–2.13 
(–1.50) 
–0.77 
(–0.81) 
–0.80 
(–0.38) 
1.65 
(0.94) 
R Square 0.15 0.15 0.18 0.29 0.35 
Notes: The results presented in this table are Generalised Method of Moments estimates for four 
different specifications for cross-section of 50 firms, the model is  
     Qi = a + bCGIi +cXi + εi 
Dependent variable is Tobin’s Q is (book value of debt plus market value of common 
equity) divided by book value of assets. CGI is total Corporate Governance Index. The 
control variables include: Firm size is natural logarithm of total assets; Leverage is book 
value of debt divided by book value of total asset; Growth is growth rate of sales.  
The instruments: Age is natural logarithm of number of years of listing at KSE, Profit is 
natural logarithm of net income/total assets, DFOR is dummy variable which is one if the 
firm has foreign investment and zero otherwise, DN is a dummy variable if the firms has 
block holder zero otherwise, DKSE, is a dummy variable if the firm is included in KSE 100 
index and zero otherwise.  
 
when include with other sub-indices but this effect is marginally significant. 
These results show that most of the firms have ownership with dominant block 
holder or have ownership concentration and in block holder firm board 
independence is not associated with good performance. The assumption of 
agency theory does not fully apply to these firms where the alignment of 
ownership and control is tighter thus suggesting the need of outside directors on 
the board of these firms. As control variables are included specification of 
model improves. 
The results of firm performance including control variables are also 
consistent with prior research. The coefficient of size is positive and significant 
in most of the cases. This shows that the listed firms that are likely to grow 
faster usually have more intangible assets and they adopt better corporate 
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governance practices. The coefficient of growth is significant and positive 
because higher growth opportunities are associated with higher firm valuation. 
The coefficient of leverage is positive and significant, is consistent with the 
prediction of standard theory of capital structure which says that higher leverage 
increase firm’s value due to the interest tax-shield [Rajan and Zingales (1998)].  
 
6.  CONCLUSION 
The relationship between corporate governance variables has been widely 
analysed for the developed markets but very little work has been done on how a 
broad range of governance mechanism factors effect the firm performance in 
thinly traded emerging markets. In this study we fill this gap by analysing the 
relationship between corporate governance and firm performance for the 
Karachi Stock Market. To proxy for firm-level governance we use a rating 
system to evaluate the stringency of a set of governance practices and cover 
various governance categories: such as board composition, ownership and 
shareholdings and transparency. Our sample firm consists of 50 firms which are 
active, representative of all non-financial sectors and comprises more than 80 
percent of market capitalisation at Karachi stock market.  
Our results document a positive and significant relation between the 
quality of firm-level corporate governance and firm performance. The possible 
endogeneity is tackled by estimating the model by Generalised Method of 
Moments is used as estimation technique with inclusion of several control 
variables. In general the ownership and shareholders rights that align the 
managers and shareholders interest are significantly valued by investors. This is 
also true for board composition and independence index.  Both these sub-indices 
have positive association with firm performance. These results are consistent 
with agency theory which focuses on monitoring of managers whose interests 
are assumed to diverge from those of other share holders. However the 
assumptions of agency theory are not applied to block holder owned firms. Most 
of the firms listed on KSE are family owned or institution owned. In these firms 
the alignment of ownership and control is tight and thus suggesting the need of 
outside directors on the board. However the results show that open and 
transparent disclosure mechanism that reduces the information asymmetry have 
no affect on firm performance. This is due to the reason that we have used the 
annual reports as data source and these reports do not reveal all the information 
required for rating corporate governance. 
Our results show that Corporate Governance Code potentially improves 
the governance and decision making process of firms listed at KSE. Large 
shareholders still have a tight grip of companies. However we point out that 
adequate firm-level governance standard can not replace the solidity of the firm. 
The low production and bad management practices can not be covered with 
transparent disclosures and transparency standards.  
  
16 
Appendices 
 
Appendix A1  
Corporate Governance Index (CGI) Components 
 
Sub-index 1: The Board of Directors                                              
 (i) Board Size (number of directors). 
 (ii) Board Composition (Clear cut job description of all board members). 
 (iii) Chairman CEO separation (if not any lead director). 
 (iv) Outside directors available to board (independent directors, nominee 
directors). 
 (v) Board attendance (board meetings). 
 (vi) Outside director attendance in Meetings. 
 (vii) Existence of the position of CFO. 
 (viii) Directors representing minority shareholders. 
 
Sub-index 2: Ownership and Shareholdings                                            
 (i) Presence of outside block holder (more than 10 percent shareholdings). 
 (ii) Does the CEO own shares. 
 (iii) Directors ownership (block ownership) other than CEO and 
Chairman. 
 (iv) Chairman or CEO is Block Holder (10 percent). 
 (v) Concentration of ownership (Top five). 
 (vi) Dividend Policy. 
 (vii) Staff benefits other than wages and salaries. 
 
Sub-index 3: Transparency, Disclosures and Auditing                                             
 (i) Does the company have full disclosure of corporate governance 
practices. 
 (ii) Does the company disclose how much it paid to its auditor for 
consulting and other work. 
 (iii) Does the company disclose full biographies of its board members. 
 (iv) Disclosure of internal audit committee. 
 (vi) Disclosure of board directors and executive staff members’ 
Remuneration. 
 (vii) Disclosure in the company’s annual report) of share ownership 
according to the requirement of Code. 
 (viii) Information of the executive management staff members ownership 
(employees ownership). 
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Appendix A2  
List of Companies 
Companies Symbols 
 (1) Aruj Garments ARUJG 
 (2) Honda Atlas HONDAA 
 (3) Engro Chmecial ENGRO 
 (4) Unilever Pakistan UNIP 
 (5) Pakistan Gum and Chemicals Ltd. PAKGUM 
 (6) Abbot Pakistan ABBOT 
 (7) Sakrand Sugar Mills SAKSM 
 (8) Pakistan Hotel Development Ltd. PAKH 
 (9) Bata Pakistan BATA 
 (10) Pakistan Petroleum Ltd. PPL 
 (11) Oil and Gas development Corp Ltd. OGDC 
 (12) Agriauto Industries Ltd. AGRI 
 (13) Pakistan PVC Ltd. PAKPVC 
 (14) Pakistan Papersack Corporation PAKPAPC 
 (15) Mandviwalla Mauser MANDM 
 (16) Shahtaj Sugar Mills SHAHT 
 (17) S.G. Fibre Ltd. SGFL 
 (18) Mirza Sugar Mills MIRGAS 
 (19) Emco Industries Limited EMCOI 
 (20) Metropolitan Steel METRO 
 (21) Moonlite(Pak) MOONLITE 
 (22) Merit Packing Ltd. MERITP 
 (23) Pakistan Services PAKS 
 (24) ICI Pakistan ICIPAK 
 (25) Suzuki Motorcycles SUZM 
 (26) Mohammad Farooq Textiles MOHFT 
 (27) Paramount Spinning Mills PSM 
 (28) Azam Textiles AZAM 
 (29) Dar Es Salaam DARES 
 (30) Sindh Abadgar,s SINDHA 
 (31) Ellcot Spinning Mills ELLCOTS 
 (32) Ayesha Textile AYSHAT 
 (33) Brother Textiles Ltd. BROTHERT 
 (34) Mitchell’s Fruit MITCH 
 (35) Indus Polyester Company INDUSP 
 (36) Mirpurkhas Sugar Mills MIRS 
 (37) Nestle Pakistan NESTLE 
 (38) Din Moters DINM 
 (39) Indus Moters INDUSM 
 (40) Maple Leaf Cement MAPLEL 
 (41) National Refinery NATR 
 (42) Pakistan Tobaco PAKTAB 
 (43) Dawod Hericules DAWOODH 
 (44) Sui Nothern SUIN 
 (45) Fuji Fertiliser FFC 
 (46) Fuji Bin Quasim FBQ 
 (47) PTCL PTCL 
 (48) Ferozson LTD FERL 
 (49) Southern Electric SOUTE 
 (50) Japan Powers JAPP 
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Appendix A3 
Evidence on Performance and Corporate Governance Sub-indices 
 1 2 3 
Board Composition 
Board 0.02 
(1.22) 
0.01 
(1.53) 
0.02 
(2.06) 
Size  0.05 
(3.39) 
0.04 
(1.39) 
Leverage   4.56 
(2.02) 
Intercept –0.27 
 (–0.23) 
–0.63 
(–1.26) 
–2.10 
(–1.50) 
R Square 0.10 0.17 0.19 
Ownership and Shareholdings 
Share 0.01 
(1.85) 
0.01 
(1.01) 
0.01 
(1.41) 
Size  0.04 
(3.10) 
0.02 
(1.08) 
Leverage   3.04 
(1.83) 
Intercept 0.04 
(2.16) 
–0.51 
(–0.98) 
–0.78 
(–0.80) 
R Square 0.11 0.13 0.17 
Disclosure and Transparency 
Disc 0.02 
(1.60) 
0.01 
(1.15) 
0.01 
(0.18) 
Size  0.04 
(2.84) 
0.02 
(1.05) 
Leverage    2.33 
(1.90) 
Intercept –0.36 
(–0.51) 
–0.88 
(–1.01) 
–0.51 
(–0.22) 
R Square 0.14 0.14 0.16 
Notes: The results presented in this table are Generalised Method of Moments estimates for four 
different specifications for cross-section of 50 firms, the model is  
     Qi = a + bCGIi +cXi + εi 
Dependent variable is Tobin’s Q is (book value of debt plus market value of common 
equity) divided by book value of assets. CGI is total Corporate Governance Index. The 
control variables include: Firm size is natural logarithm of total assets; Leverage is book 
value of debt divided by book value of total asset; Growth is growth rate of sales.  
The instruments: Age is natural logarithm of number of years of listing at KSE, Profit is 
natural logarithm of net income/total assets, DFOR is dummy variable which is one if the 
firm has foreign investment and zero otherwise, DN is a dummy variable if the firms has 
block holder zero otherwise, DKSE, is a dummy variable if the firm is included in KSE 100 
index and zero otherwise. 
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